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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of
the Industrial Commission

(now the Utah Labor Commission)

pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 (1994) (repealed
effective

July

1,

1997);

Utah

Code Ann. §

34A-l-303(6)

(1997)).x

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that

Petitioner Lori Warner (the "applicant") failed to establish
that her employment legally caused her claimed back injuries
pursuant to Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986) .
This is a matter of application of law to a set of facts.
The Industrial Commission's ruling is entitled to a strong
presumption of correctness, and the ruling will be affirmed
unless the applicant establishes that the Commission abused its
discretion.

Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah

1997) .

x

The entire Utah Workers' Compensation Act was repealed and
recodified effective July 1, 1997, and the Industrial Commission
was replaced by the Labor Commission. This brief refers primarily
to the Act as it was in effect on March 24, 1995, the date of the
applicant's claimed injury. In addition, the brief refers to the
"Industrial Commission," or simply the "Commission."
-1-

2.

Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that

Petitioner Lori Warner failed to establish that her employment
"medically caused" her claimed injuries.
This issue requires review of factual findings.

These

findings are entitled to great deference, and the court of
appeals will reverse only if the petitioner establishes that
the findings are not "supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997).

Utah

A person challenging

factual findings must marshal all the evidence supporting the
findings

and then demonstrate that the findings

justified by that evidence.

are not

VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901

P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1994)
(1) The commission has the duty and the full
power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the
facts and apply the law in this or any other title
or chapter that it administers and to:

Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (1994)
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured and the dependents of each such employee who
is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely selfinflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss
sustained on account of the injury or death, and
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such
-2-

amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this
chapter.
The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under
this chapter shall be on the employer and its
insurance carrier and not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-77 (1994)
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for
compensation for injury by accident, or for death,
arising out of and in the course of employment, and
if the employer or its insurance carrier denies
liability, the commission may refer the medical
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by
the commission.

(2)

. . . .

(d) The commission may base its finding
and decision on the report of the panel, medical
director, or medical consultants, but is not bound
by the report if other substantial conflicting
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1997)
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has
been
substantially
prejudiced by any of the
following:

(d) The
agency
has
interpreted or applied the law;

erroneously

(g) The agency action is based on a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
(h)

the agency action is:

(i)
an abuse of the
delegated to the agency by statute;
•

discretion

• • •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a Petition for Review of an Order by the Utah
Industrial Commission holding that Respondents Merit Medical
Systems, Inc., and TIG Insurance Co. are not liable to pay
workers' compensation benefits to Petitioner Lori Warner for
back problems that became symptomatic beginning in March 1995.

Course of Proceedings
Petitoner Lori Warner (the "applicant") instituted these
proceedings before the Industrial Commission of Utah on June
22, 1995, when she filed an Application for Hearing seeking
workers' compensation benefits from her employer, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc., and its insurer, TIG Insurance Co. (referred to
collectively as "Merit Medical"), for injuries she allegedly
sustained on March 24, 1995.

R. 2.

She filed an amended

application for hearing on August 22, 1995.

R. 31.

Merit

Medical denied liability on the ground that the applicant's

-4-

claimed injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her
employment.

R. 44-46.

The matter went to a hearing in front of the Honorable
Barbara A. Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge, on February 6,
1996.

Transcript, R. 73-187.

After the hearing, Judge

Elicerio referred the matter to a medical panel for an opinion
on various issues, including whether the applicant's back
problems were causally related to her employment with Merit
Medical. R. 189-200. The medical panel issued a report, which
was received by Judge Elicerio on July 11, 1996, finding only
a

"limited"

causal

connection

between

the

applicant's

employment and her back complaints. R. 412-19. Judge Elicerio
then issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order
holding Merit Medical liable to pay compensation and benefits
for the applicant's claimed injury.

ALJ Findings, R. 425-39

(Addendum Exhibit 2).
Merit Medical filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on October 11, 1996. R. 440-47. On March 17,
1997, the Commission entered a new Order, granting the Motion
for Review. Commission Order, R. 453-61 (Addendum Exhibit 1).
The Commission found that the applicant failed to establish
that her back condition was either legally or medically caused
by her employment with Merit Medical.

On April 7, 1997, the

applicant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Commission, R. 462-65, which was denied in an Order dated May 2,
1997. Addendum Exhibit 3. The applicant filed a Petition for

-5-

Review on May 30, 1997, R. 474, and a Docketing Statement on
June 23, 1997. R. 482-519.

Statement of Facts
Merit Medical Systems manufactures plastic parts for
medical devices.
1).

Commission Order, R. 453 (Addendum Exhibit

These parts are made by large machines, which drop the

completed parts into small plastic bins or "totes" approximately two-and-a-half feet long, eighteen inches wide, and only
eighteen inches deep.

R. 453-54.

A molding operator then

removes the bins from the machines and carries them to a nearby
table where the bins are emptied into larger containers.

R.

454. Periodically, the bins are taken to a scale for weighing,
or taken to a table for measuring.

R. 454.

These bins are

lifted approximately nine times per hour, but they weigh only
five to twenty pounds on average, with an occasional bin
weighing up to twenty-six pounds.2
(Addendum Exhibit 2).

ALJ Findings, R. 432

Molding operators also vacuum and clean

around their machines at the end of their shifts.

R. 429.

Applicant Lori Warner began working as a molding operator
for Merit Medical in January 1995. Commission Order, R. 453.
She worked a basic forty-hour week without difficulty, and she

2

The applicant appears to claim that the bins averaged twentysix pounds. Petitioner's Brief at 9. However, the ALJ and the
Commission made specific findings, as set forth in the text, and
these findings must be accepted as conclusive unless the applicant
marshals all the evidence supporting them. E.g.. Featherstone v.
Indust. Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). At any
rate, the Commission's finding in this respect is supported by the
evidence. See, e.g., R. 141:1-11.
-6-

never felt any back pain, soreness, or stiffness while she
worked for Merit. Transcript, R. 113:17-21, 114:5-11, 116:1214, 123:22-25. But when the applicant was at home on March 24,
1995, she felt a pain in her back. R. 113:17-21. She had not
worked that day, as it was her scheduled day off.
17.

R. 116:15-

In fact, she did not work a full shift on the previous

day, either.

The machines had been down, making her job even

easier than usual, R. 113:22 - 114:3, 123:6-8, and things were
so slow that the applicant's boss let her go home early because
she complained of a headache.

R. 103:16 - 104:2.

As later revealed by the medical evidence, the applicant
was suffering from long-standing degenerative disc disease at
the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels of her lumbar spine, along with facet
arthritis. CT Scan Report, R. 409-10, Medical Panel Report, R.
417. In addition, she had previously injured her back in 1986,
at which time she was diagnosed with a "twisting injury" and
"severe" acute low back strain, with pain focused on the L4-5
and L5-S1 levels. R. 311.
The applicant went to Instacare on March 24, 1995.

She

reported back pain, but she did not attribute this pain to
anything that happened at her job. R. 246. She was prescribed
muscle relaxants, but her pain evidently did not clear up. She
called in sick on March 26, but once again she did not even
suggest that her back pain was caused by anything that happened
at work.

R. 146:24 - 147:2.

In fact, she never reported any

work-related back problems until three weeks after she first
sought treatment, on April 14. R. 146:13-17. And even then,
-7-

she never reported any specific incident at work that caused
her even the slightest back pain.

R. 147:11-18.

On March 28, a CT scan was performed on the applicant's
lumbar spine. At L4-5, the scan revealed degenerative changes,
a broad based Grade I (minor) disc bulge, and what appeared to
be an old apophyseal avulsion.

R. 409.

The CT scan also

revealed a "vague increased soft tissue density" that suggested
a possible extruded fragment, but this could not be confirmed.
Id.

At L5-S1, the CT scan uncovered even more significant

degenerative

changes,

including

facet

arthritis

and

an

irregularity of the posterior ring apophysis that possibly
indicated an old disc herniation.
compromise was noted.

Id*

No significant neural

Id.

The applicant underwent an L5-S1 discectomy in June 1995.
Commission Order, R. 454, and evidently returned to work three
months later. R. 109:12-14. She apparently was off work again
for a while after that, but by the February 1996 hearing, she
was working full time for a different employer.

R. 110:8-15.

In January 1996, her treating physician rated her as having
only a five percent permanent partial impairment.

R. 381.

In late January 1996, the applicant was seen by Dr. Gerald
Moress and Dr. Wallace Hess at the request of Merit Medical.
R. 399.

Drs. Moress and Hess carefully reviewed the appli-

cant's medical records and performed a thorough examination.
Drs. Moress and Hess performed the standard credibility tests
on the applicant, and her responses were "inappropriate" on
five of the seven categories.

R. 405.
-8-

These doctors assessed

the applicant as suffering from a "pain disorder characterized
by psychological factors and general medical condition."

R.

406.
Drs. Moress and Hess concluded that there was no causal
connection between the applicant's employment and her claimed
back problems.

They found it significant that "there was no

incident at work that could be identified."

R. 406.

They

further noted that the CT scan revealed only a small disc bulge
at L4-5, and possibly at L5-S1, but that it also showed a
"fracture of the apophyseal ring which had nothing to do with
the industrial accident and is developmental in origin."

Id.

The doctors therefore concluded that none of the applicant's
impairment, disability, or medical care was attributable to the
claimed industrial accident.

R. 407.

The matter went to a hearing in February 1996.

Merit

Medical denied liability on the ground that the applicant's job
was neither the legal cause nor the medical cause of her
injury, pursuant to Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986).

After the hearing, the administrative law judge

referred the matter to a medical panel for an opinion regarding
medical causation and other issues. R. 189-200. The medical
panel noted that the CT scan had revealed degenerative changes
in the applicant's lumbar spine and that subsequent studies
confirmed narrowing at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels, along with
spurring and scoliosis.

R. 417.

The panel's report was

unclear, but it ultimately concluded that there was only a
"limited"

causal

connection

between
-9-

the

applicant's work

exposure and her subsequent back problems.
also

concluded

that

the

industrial

R. 417. The panel

exposure

aggravated

a

preexisting condition, but it clarified that there had been
only a "temporary aggravation related to her work."

R. 418.

The

of

panel

therefore

attributed

impairment to her work.

Id.

only

one

percent

her

The panel also opined that the

applicant's surgery was necessitated by the work exposure only
"to a limited extent."

Id.

The panel then cautioned that "it

is quite possible that the surgery may not have been needed at
that time had there been more concern for the functional aspect
of her reaction to her total circumstances."

Id.

After receiving the medical panel report, Judge Elicerio
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order.

R.

425-39 (Addendum Exhibit 2) . She interpreted the medical panel
report as finding that the work for Merit Medical was a medical
cause of the applicant's back condition, and she adopted this
finding as her own.

R. 434-35.

She also found that legal

causation was barely satisfied, concluding that the applicant's
job, which required her to lift the five-to-twenty-pound bins
approximately nine times per hour, was "slightly" more exertive
than what the average person does in his or her
nonemployment life.

everyday

R. 435-36.

The Commission overruled the ALJ on both grounds. R. 45361.

The Commission reviewed the medical reports and concluded

that the applicant had not established a medical link between
her employment and her injuries.
considered

the

medical

panel
-10-

The Commission carefully

report,

a

report

by

the

applicant's treating physician, and the report provided by Drs.
Moress and Hess, and it concluded that the Moress/Hess report
was the most persuasive medical evidence.

R. 457-58.

The

Commission reasoned as follows:
The Industrial Commission finds the medical panel's
report
somewhat
unpersuasive
because
of
its
ambiguous and equivocating answers.
In contrast,
the report of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess is well
reasoned and consistent with the circumstances under
which Ms. Warner began to experience low back pain.

The Industrial
Commission
therefore
accepts
the
opinion of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess that there is no
medical causal connection
between Ms. Warner's work
at Merit and her low back
injury.
R. 458 (emphasis added).
The Industrial Commission also found that the applicant
had failed to establish that her job was a legal cause of her
back injuries, because her job did not require an "unusual
exertion," as required by Allen.
"carefully considered

R. 456-57.

The Commission

the demands of Ms. Warner's work at

Merit, as well as the manner in which Ms. Warner performed
those duties," and concluded that her work exertions were not
unusual or extraordinary.

R. 456.

The Commission concluded,

The Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms.
Warner's work required her to carry as many as 9
bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy and
usually were not carried very far. When the full
range
of
all
non-employment
activities
are
considered, even the frequency of Ms. Warner's
lifting and carrying at work is not unusual or
extraordinary. The Industrial Commission therefore
finds that Ms. Warner's work at Merit is not the
legal cause of her injury.
R. 457.
This appeal followed.

-11-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Applicant Lori Warner seeks to require Merit Medical to
pay compensation and medical expenses even though there is no
real connection between her employment with Merit Medical and
the back problems that became symptomatic in March 1995.
Industrial

Commission

carefully

considered

the

The

applicant's

evidence and held that she had failed to demonstrate that her
employment was either a medical cause or a legal cause of her
back problems.

Both of these determinations are entitled to

deference on appeal, and the applicant has not established that
they are erroneous.
Under Allen v. Industrial Commission, an employee must
establish both legal causation and medical causation in order
to recover workers' compensation benefits.
causation,

an

employee

with

a

To establish legal

preexisting

condition

must

demonstrate that his or her employment imposed an "unusual or
extraordinary exertion" that contributed to the injury.

To

show medical causation, the employee must show that the workrelated exertion actually physically caused his or her injury.
If the employee fails to meet either element, compensation must
be denied.
The Commission did not err in concluding that the applicant failed to establish legal causation.

This conclusion is

entitled to deference under UAPA and under Drake v. Industrial
Commission, a recent Utah Supreme Court case holding that an
administrative agency's application of a highly fact-sensitive
-12-

legal

standard

is entitled to a

"strong presumption" of

correctness.
In Drake, the supreme court held that the determination as
to whether an employee was on a "special errand" was entitled
to heightened deference because the question was highly factspecific and did not readily yield uniform rules.

And the

issue in our case, whether the applicant's employment constituted an unusual exertion, is even more fact-specific than the
issue involved in Drake.

In addition, the Commission has

experience and expertise in applying the unusual exertion test
because it specializes in workers' compensation cases and deals
with this issue all the time. Therefore, under the principles
set forth in Drake, the Commission's determination that the
applicant failed to establish legal causation is also entitled
to deference.
The Commission's determination regarding legal causation
should be upheld by the court.

The evidence presented before

the Commission shows that the applicant's job did not involve
an unusual or extraordinary exertion:

she simply had to lift

small plastic bins containing plastic parts.

She had to lift

these with some frequency, but the bins were light and she did
not have to carry them very far. The exertions involved in the
applicant's work are certainly comparable to those involved in
many everyday activities.

Therefore, the Commission did not

abuse its wide discretion in finding that legal causation was
not shown.
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Because the applicant failed to establish legal causation,
the denial of benefits should be affirmed.

But the Commission

also did not err in finding that the applicant had failed to
establish medical causation.

This is a question of fact, and

the court of appeals must affirm if the Commission's finding is
supported by substantial evidence in the record.

In our case,

the Commission relied on the persuasive medical report prepared
by Dr. Gerald Moress and Dr. Wallace Hess, who examined the
applicant on behalf of Merit Medical.
issued

a confusing

A medical panel had

report that appeared to contradict

the

report of Drs. Moress and Hess, but the Commission carefully
considered both reports and found the Moress/Hess report to be
more persuasive.

Under the plain language of the governing

statute, the Commission

is free to consider evidence

that

contradicts a medical panel report, and the Commission is not
bound

by

conflicting

a

medical
evidence"

panel

report

supports

a

if

"other

contrary

substantial

finding.

In

addition, the Commission's finding was certainly supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, the finding that there was no
medical causation should also be upheld on appeal.

ARGUMENT

Under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, an employer is
liable to pay compensation and medical expenses only if the
employee establishes an injury "by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment."
-14-

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45

(1994) (recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (1997)).
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court explained that compensation is to be awarded
"only where there is a sufficient causal connection between the
disability and the working conditions."

Id. at 24-25.

The

Allen court adopted a two-part test to determine causation:
the employee must prove that his or her employment was both the
"legal cause" and the "medical cause" of the injury.
25-27.

Id. at

If the employee fails to prove either of these

elements, he or she is not entitled to compensation.

E.g. ,

Helf v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 1024, 1027 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) .
In our case, the Industrial Commission determined that the
applicant had failed to satisfy either
test.3

prong of the Allen

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the applicant

had not established that her injury "arose out of and in the
course of" her employment with Merit Medical.

For this court

to reverse, it must find that the Commission erred in both
determinations.

However, on appeal, the applicant has failed

to demonstrate that either of the Commission's rulings was
erroneous.

The finding that the applicant did not establish

legal causation is within the Commission's discretion, and the
finding

that

she did not establish medical causation is

3

The Commission, and not the administrative law judge, is the
ultimate finder of fact in workers' compensation cases, and it is
the Commission's decision that must be reviewed by the court of
appeals. E.g., Virgin v. Board of Revie /, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commission's
order denying compensation should be affirmed.

I.

THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPLICANT
FAILED TO PROVE THAT HER EMPLOYMENT LEGALLY CAUSED HER
BACK CONDITION.
Under Allen, when an employee has a preexisting condition,

an aggravation of that condition is not compensable unless the
employee establishes that the aggravation resulted from a workrelated "unusual or extraordinary exertion."

Id. at 26.

If

the employee fails to meet this burden, then legal causation is
not met, and the claim must be denied.

The applicant in our

case suffered from preexisting degenerative disc disease, so
she was required to meet the "unusual exertion" standard.4
However, the Commission found that the applicant's work-related
exertions were neither unusual nor extraordinary:

she was

required simply to lift small plastic bins containing plastic
parts.

This finding is entitled to a great deal of deference

under Utah case law.

A.

The
Industrial
Commission's
entitled to deference.

determination

is

Under the Utah Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), a
reviewing court may reverse agency action if the agency has
"erroneously interpreted or applied the law."
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997).

Utah Code Ann.

However, in determining whether an

4

The applicant has not challenged this finding on appeal.
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agency's application of the law to the facts was "erroneous,"
the appellate court will review the agency's ruling with some
measure of deference, depending on the nature of the legal
standard being applied. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,
181-82 (Utah 1997).

As noted above, to establish that her

claimed injuries were legally caused by her employment, the
applicant was required to show that her injuries arose from an
"unusual or extraordinary exertion."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 26.

The determination as to whether this standard was met is highly
fact-dependent, does not readily yield uniform rules, and is
one which an appellate court could not profitably review de
novo in every instance.
the

Commission's

Therefore, the standard of review of

determination

on this

issue

is

one of

heightened deference.
The reasoning employed by the Utah Supreme Court in Drake
represented a major departure from the analytical model previously used in determining the standard of review of agency
actions. Drake did not mention UAPA, nor did it discuss any of
the important cases interpreting UAPA.

Therefore, to fully

understand Drake's effect on the standard of review analysis
under UAPA, a little history is in order.

1.

Pre-UAPA: The determination as to whether an
employee has established an unusual exertion is
entitled to intermediate deference.

Before the enactment of UAPA, appellate courts generally
reviewed agency determinations under three standards of review.
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Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991);
see also Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983).

Questions of "general law" were

reviewed nondeferentially, using a correction-of-error standard.

Morton, 814 P. 2d at 585. Findings of fact, on the other

hand, were reviewed with great deference:

appellate courts

upheld such findings if they were supported by "evidence of any
substance."

See Admin. Servs., 658 P. 2d at 608-09. But "mixed

questions of law and fact," or questions involving the application of law to basic facts, were generally reviewed under an
intermediate standard, and agency decisions on those questions
were upheld if they were "reasonable or rational." This intermediate standard applied unless the court was in as good a
position as the agency to make the determination, considering
factors such as the agency's expertise and experience in the
area.

Id. at 610; Morton, 814 P.2d at 585-87.
Under these principles, Industrial Commission applications

of the Allen "unusual exertion" test were reviewed using a
bifurcated standard.

The Commission's determination as to the

precise requirements of an employee's job, an issue of fact,
was reviewed with great deference.

However, the determination

whether the employee's job-related activities amounted to an
unusual exertion was a "mixed question," Price River Coal Co.
v. Indus. Comm'n, 731 P.2d

1079, 1082 (Utah 1986), and was

reviewed under the intermediate standard:

the Commission's

determination as to whether the "unusual exertion" standard was
met would stand unless the court found that the decision was
-18-

not "'within the limits of reasonableness and rationality."1
Sisco Hilte v. Indus. Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Admin. Servs., 658 P.2d at 610); accord
Stouffer Foods v. Indus. Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Smith & Edwards v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d
1016, 1017-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

2.

UAPA

UAPA: The Commission has discretion to apply
the Workers' Compensation Act in cases before
it, and its determinations are to be upheld
unless they are unreasonable.

changed

the

way

appellate

courts

approached

Industrial Commission rulings under the Workers' Compensation
Act.

Under UAPA, an appellate court may reverse agency action

if the agency "erroneously interpreted or applied the law."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997).
tional,

the

supreme

court

declared

that

In Morton Internathis

new

statute

generally imposed a correction-of-error standard in reviewing
an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.
814 P.2d at 587-88.
discretion

However, if the agency was granted some

to interpret or apply the statute, then the agency

action would be reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard
provided in subsection 16(4)(h)(i), which states that a court
may reverse if the agency action is "an abuse of the discretion
delegated to the agency by statute."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

16(4)(h)(i) (1997). Thus, in determining how much deference to
afford agency action, the key was no longer simply the agency's
-19-

expertise and experience; instead, the focus was on whether the
agency had been granted any discretion, implicitly or explicitly, by the statute.

Morton, 814 P.2d at 588.

UAPA, and the explanation given it in Morton, proved to be
difficult to apply, and the post-UAPA cases reviewing Industrial Commission actions under the Workers' Compensation Act
have not yielded consistent results.

For example, some cases

have

appeals

concluded

that

the

court

of

should

review

Industrial Commission rulings under a strict correction-oferror standard.

See, e.g., Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d

1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); King v. Indus. Comm'n, 850
P.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

These cases generally

looked at the language of section 35-1-45 and simply concluded
that the statute did not contain a grant of discretion. Cross,
824 P.2d at 1204; King, 850 P.2d at 1291-92.

It appears that

most of the subsequent cases addressing the standard of review
under the Workers' Compensation Act have relied on Cross and
King, or their progeny.5
A significant new case, however, has drawn a distinction
between
Workers'
application

review

of

the

Compensation

Commission's
Act

and

interpretation

review

of

the

of

the

Commission's

of the Act to specific factual situations. Caporoz

v. Indus. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

5

See

E.g., Walls v. Indus. Comm'n, 857 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Cross and King); Crapo v. Indus. Comm'n, 922
P.2d 39, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Cross and King); Buczvnski v.
Indus. Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Walls and
Cross) .
-20-

also VanLeeuwen v. Indus, Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995); Employers' Reinsurance Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 856
P.2d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Billings, P.J., concurring
in the result, joined by Russon, J.). In Caporoz, the most
recent pronouncement on the issue, the court recognized that
former section 35-1-16 of the Act grants the Commission "the
duty

and the

full power, jurisdiction, and authority to

determine the facts and apply the law." Therefore, Commission
applications of the Act should be reviewed under the more
deferential "reasonableness" standard.

Caporoz, 945 P.2d at

143; see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16(1) (1994) (recodified at Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997)).
Caporoz

is

more

consistent

with

UAPA's

legislative

history. As noted in Savage Industries v. Tax Commission, 811
P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991), the UAPA standards of review are
based on section 5-116
Procedure Act.

of the Model State Administrative

Subsection 16(4)(d) of UAPA is identical to

subsection 5-116(c)(4) of the Model Act. The commentators to
the Model Act noted that the standards set forth in that
provision "reflect the well-accepted principle that the role

the

reviewing

court

is,

in general,

a limited

one."

of

Model

State Admin. Proc. Act § 5-116 comment, 15 U.L.A. 128 (1990)
(emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 4). And, addressing the
specific provision at issue in our case, the commentators
specifically explained that agency applications

of law are to

be reviewed under a more deferential standard than are agency
interpretations

of the law:
-21-

Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct matters
— interpretation and application of the law. With
regard to the agency's interpretation
of the law,
courts generally give little deference to the
agency, with the result that a court may decide that
the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if
the court merely disagrees with the agency's
interpretation.
By contrast, with regard to the
agency's application
of the law to
specific
situations, the enabling statute normally confers
some discretion upon the agency.
Accordingly, a
court should find reversible error in the agency's
application of the law only if the agency has
improperly exercised its discretion . . . .
Id. (italics in original, bold print added).
While statutory interpretation and application are related
concepts, there are definite differences between the two.

For

example, when an issue requires the consideration of only a few
simple, undisputed, basic facts, the matter can be seen as one
of statutory interpretation.

In these cases, the court can

issue a general rule that will uniformly govern all future
situations of a similar nature.
tion"

cases, review

is proper

Thus, in these "interpretaunder

the

less

deferential

correction-of-error standard.
But where the issue is whether an established legal standard is satisfied, and if the facts are disputed or highly
involved, or if the standard itself is nebulous (e.g., whether
an action is "reasonable"), then the question is primarily one
of "application."

And, as recognized in Caporoz, the Commis-

sion has been granted the discretion to apply the Workers'
Compensation Act, so its applications must be reviewed with
deference.
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Both King and Cross were "interpretation" cases. In King
the issue was whether an employee's incarceration after an industrial accident affected his or her entitlement to temporary
total disability.

850 P.2d at 1292. In Cross, the issue was

whether an employee is entitled to benefits when driving home
from work.

824 P.2d at 1204.

In both of these cases, the

facts were undisputed and straightforward, and in each case the
court's holding effectively created a uniform rule applicable
to all future cases.

Caporoz, however, was an "application"

case: the issue was whether a decedent's two sisters qualified
as "dependents" under the Act and were thus entitled to death
benefits.

945 P.2d at 142-43.

In that case, the facts were

highly detailed, and the standard being applied was very factspecific.

The holding in that case, that those particular

sisters were not dependents, is not a generally applicable
"rule."

3.

Drake

v.

Industrial

Commission:

Where

the

legal standard being applied grants the agency
discretion in its operation, the agency's
determination will be accorded a strong
presumption of correctness.
The Utah Supreme Court employed a new method of analysis
in Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997).
In Drake, the employee was injured in an automobile accident
while driving home after work.

939 P.2d at 179. She lived in

Ogden, but she normally worked at her employer's Salt Lake City
office.

About two or three days per week, however, she
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delivered documents to her employer's Ogden office at the end
of the day, before going home.

The route from the Salt Lake

City office to her home via the Ogden office was about five or
six miles
directly

farther than a route from the Salt Lake
home.

She did

this

regularly

for months.

office
The

accident took place after she left the Ogden office on her way
home.

Id.
The Industrial Commission denied the employee's claim for

workers' compensation benefits under the "coming and going"
rule, which provides that an employee is not in the course of
her employment when she is going to or coming home from work.
Id. at 180.

The employee claimed that she was acting in the

course of her employment under the "special errand" exception
to the rule, but the Commission found that, because the deliveries to the Ogden office were part of the employee's regular
duties, she was not on a special errand.

Instead, her work day

simply ended when she left the Ogden office, and she was not in
the course of her employment while simply on her way home when
the accident took place.
The court of appeals reversed.
Ct. App. 1995).

Drake, 904 P.2d 203 (Utah

The court first held that the Commission did

not have any discretion to interpret the Workers' Compensation
Act, so the Commission's denial of benefits would be reviewed
"for correctness."

Id. at 205.

The court then engaged in an

independent application of the special errand doctrine to the
facts and concluded that the delivery of the documents to the
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Ogden office was

in fact a special errand, outside the

employee's regular duties.

Id. at 206-07.

The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
court of appeals, holding that a more deferential standard of
review was required.

939 P.2d at 184.

In doing so, the

supreme court did not apply the standard UAPA "discretion
granted by statute" analysis (in fact, except for one brief
"see also" citation, UAPA was not even mentioned)

. The supreme

court instead adopted the standard of review analysis used in
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 934-39 (Utah 1994), a criminal
case. In Pena, the issue was whether the trial court had erred
in

finding

that

an

investigatory

reasonable suspicion.

stop was

869 P. 2d at 934.

supported

by

Addressing the

standard of review, the supreme court held in that case that
whether a set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
question of law, but the trial court's legal conclusion would
be reviewed with some deference, because the legal standard
itself

conveys a measure of discretion to a trial court in its

operation.

Id. at 939.

The supreme court applied this analysis in Drake.

The

court explained that, in determining the proper standard of
review, the first step is to decide whether the issue being
reviewed is a question of fact, a question of law, or a "mixed
question requiring application of the law to the facts."

939

P.2d at 181. The court further explained that, with regard to
mixed questions, a bifurcated standard would be used.
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Id.

Under

this

bifurcated

standard,

findings

as

to

the

underlying empirical facts are reviewed under the deferential
"substantial evidence" standard for factual findings. Id. But
the agency's conclusion as to whether those facts satisfy a
legal standard is not necessarily reviewed under the strict
correction-of-error standard, even though the legal effect of
a given set of facts is a question of law. Rather, an agency's
application of the law is to be reviewed with "varying degrees
of strictness," from the strict correction-of-error standard to
a broad "abuse of discretion" standard.

Id. The precise level

of deference to be granted depends on whether, based on "policy
considerations and other factors," the legal standard itself
"'actually grants some operational discretion to the trial
courts applying it.'"

Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36).

The court held that the Commission's conclusion that the
employee was not on a "special errand" was entitled to deference.

The court noted that the special errand doctrine was

highly fact-intensive.

Id.

As a result, it was unlikely that

an objective "rule" could be formulated that would apply to all
"special errand" cases.
is a question that

Id.

The court explained, "Thus, this

'we cannot profitably review de novo in

every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent
statement of the law through a course of such decisions.'"

Id.

(quoting Pena at 938). The court concluded, "Given the nature
of the legal issue, we conclude that the legal standard is one
that 'conveys a measure of discretion to [the Commission] when
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applying that standard to a given set of facts.'" Id. (quoting
Pena at 939).
Addressing the merits, the court noted that the Commission
had found that the deliveries were part of the employee's
regular

duties.

The

court

enunciated above, we defer
accord

a strong

'special.'"

reasoned,

to

presumption

Id. at 184

the

"Under the

Commission's

that

the

decision

deliveries

(emphasis added).

standard

were

and
not

The court thus

upheld the Commission's denial of benefits.
While Drake ignored UAPA, it actually appears to have
adopted

the

"interpretation"

discussed previously.

vs.

"application"

analysis

Under Drake, if the legal question is

highly fact-intensive, or if the legal standard itself requires
the use of judgment in its operation, then the legal standard
grants discretion to the agency, and the agency's decision will
be afforded a "strong presumption" of correctness.

But under

the interpretation-application analysis, such a situation would
be considered one requiring "application" of the law, and the
determination would be reviewed with deference under Caporoz.
On the other hand, if the facts are simple and the legal
standard is straightforward, or if the court's ruling could be
used as a uniform "rule," then the appellate court will review
the agency on a stricter correction-of-error standard, under
either Drake or cases such as Cross and King.
Drake also revived elements of the pre-UAPA analysis. For
a key aspect of the Pena-Drake analysis is that the standard of
review depends on whether the agency or the appellate court is
-27-

in the better position to determine whether a legal standard is
satisfied.

And one of the "policy considerations and other

factors" that must be weighed would be the agency's experience
and expertise in the subject matter.

Thus, under Drake, where

there is a mixed question of law and fact, and where the agency
has the expertise and experience, the agency's actions would
once

again

be

reviewed

under

an

intermediate

standard

of

review.

Under UAPA and Drake,
the Commission's determination as to whether an employee established
an unusual exertion is reviewed with heightened
deference.

4.

Applying these considerations to our case, it is easy to
see that the Commission's determination as to whether an unusual exertion was established must be reviewed with heightened
deference.

For whether someone's job-related exertions are

"unusual" is even more fact-intensive than the question of
whether

an errand

is

"special."

The Allen test

requires

consideration of a wide variety of factors, and each case must
be judged based on its own unique set of facts.

See, e.g. .

Smith & Edwards, 770 P.2d at 1018 (noting that the determination requires consideration

of several factors).

Further,

because each case is unique, it is quite doubtful that any
uniform

rules

or principles

"can

be

formulated

that

will

adequately address all potential facts in these cases." Drake,
939 P.2d at 182.

Thus, a court cannot profitably review each

"unusual exertion" case de novo.
-28-

Id.

In addition, the Commission has experience and expertise
in applying the Allen standard. The Commission specializes in
workers' compensation

cases, and

it applies

the unusual

exertion test all the time. The Commission is thus in the best
position to consider all the variables that arise in these
cases and to get a sense of what exertions are unusual and what
exertions are not.

See, e.g., Smith & Edwards v. Indus.

Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (intermediate
standard is appropriate for unusual exertion test because court
relies

"'heavily

upon

the

Commission's

expertise

and

familiarity with the work environment.'")
The argument for deference is even stronger in our case
than it was in Drake.

In Drake there were really only a few

key facts: the employee made her deliveries two to three times
per week, she had been doing so for months, it was expected
that she would keep making these deliveries in the future, and
the deliveries required a five or six mile detour. These facts
were undisputed, and they are much more discrete and definite
than the factors involved in the application of the unusual
exertion test. The concerns expressed in Drake thus apply with
even greater force in our situation.

B.

The Industrial Commission did not err in determining
that the applicant's employment did not involve an
unusual exertion.

The applicant had preexisting back injuries, so, under
Allen, she must demonstrate that her injury resulted from a
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work-related unusual or extraordinary exertion in order to
establish legal causation. The Industrial Commission carefully
considered the evidence regarding the demands of the applicant's

job,

and

it

unanimously

concluded

that

the

minor

physical requirements of her job did not constitute an unusual
or extraordinary exertion.6

Under UAPA and Drake, this deci-

sion is afforded a strong presumption of correctness, and the
applicant has not overcome this presumption.
Most significantly, the applicant's job did not require
any heavy lifting.

The applicant simply had to lift small

plastic bins containing light plastic parts. Commission Order,
R. 453-54 (Addendum Exhibit 1 ) .

These bins were only about

two-and-a-half feet long by one-and-a-half feet wide, and only
eighteen inches deep.

Id.

The most

these bins ever weighed,

even when full, was twenty-six pounds, and they rarely weighed
even that much:

they generally weighed no more than twenty

pounds, and they often weighed as little as five pounds.

ALJ

Findings, R. 432 (Addendum Exhibit 2 ) , Commission Order, R.
454.

This is certainly not an unusual exertion when compared

to typical nonemployment activities.
The

court

in

Allen

set

forth

activities that would be considered
activities."

specific
"typical

examples

of

nonemployment

These included taking full garbage cans to the

Commissioner Carlson purported to "dissent" from the
Commission's ruling, but he objected only to the finding of medical
causation. He did not disagree with the Commmission's conclusion
that the applicant had failed to establish legal causation.
Therefore, Commissioner Carlson's opinion should be deemed a
"concurrence in the result."
-30-

street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, and lifting a small child to chest
height.

Allen, 729 P.2d at 26.

Each of these activities

involves far greater physical strain than does lifting the
plastic bins involved in our case. See, e.g.. Smith & Edwards
v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(lift of 47.5 pounds was not an unusual exertion).
That the applicant lifted these plastic bins nine times
per hour does not make her job particularly demanding. First,
while lifting "nine times an hour" may sound like a lot in the
abstract, it means that the applicant would still have, on
average, more than six

full

minutes

between lifts. Second, and

more importantly, the bins were light.

The applicant's job

allowed her to lift a light bin, do something else for six
minutes, and then lift another one. These exertions are less
stressful than those required in many everyday activities, such
as cleaning house, performing yard work, doing laundry, or
chasing after small children.
The Commission specifically considered and rejected the
applicant's argument that her job required an unusual exertion
due to the frequency of the lifting. The Commission reasoned,
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms.
Warner's work required her to carry as many as 9
bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy and
usually
were not carried
very far.
When the
full
range of all non-employment
activities
are
[sic]
considered,
even the frequency
of Ms.
Warner's
lifting
and carrying
at work is not unusual
or
extraordinary.
Commission Order, R. 457 (emphasis added).
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Our case is easily distinguishable from Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), because
the strain caused by the employment in Nyrehn was much greater
than any strain involved in our case.
was

required

pounds.

to

lift

Id. at 331.

tubs

regularly

In Nyrehn, the employee
weighing

forty

up to

As set forth above, in our case the bins

weighed a maximum of twenty-six pounds, and even that was rare;
most of the time they were between five and twenty pounds. ALJ
Findings, R. 432.

Common experience shows that a forty-pound

lift causes a much greater strain than a five-to-twenty-pound
lift, and it is much easier to make several easy lifts than to
make one forty-pound lift.
Nvrehn

was

that

"constant

bending

different

tubs.

the
and

Moreover, an additional factor in

employee

was

stooping"

Nyrehn,

to

required
sort

800 P. 2d at

to

engage

merchandise

331.

There

in
into

are

no

comparable factual findings in our case.
As established by Drake, the Commission's determination
that the unusual exertion standard was not met is entitled to
a "strong presumption" of correctness. Drake, 939 P.2d at 184.
The Commission carefully considered the requirements of the
applicant's job and concluded that, when everything was taken
into account, the applicant's job simply did not require any
unusual exertion.

The applicant has not presented anything to

overcome this presumption.

The only authority she relies on,

Nvrehn, is distinguishable, and she has not cited any other
authority to suggest that lifting between five and twenty-six
pounds is an unusual exertion, even if done nine times in an
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hour.

The applicant has failed to establish that her back

condition was legally caused by her employment, and as such the
Commission's denial of benefits should be affirmed.

II.

THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPLICANT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HER BACK CONDITION WAS MEDICALLY
CAUSED BY HER EMPLOYMENT.
Because the applicant failed to prove legal causation,

Merit Medical

is not required

to pay benefits, and the

Commission's Order can be affirmed.
address medical causation.

Thus, the court need not

However, if the court finds that

the Commission abused its wide discretion in not finding legal
causation, then Merit Medical still is not liable for any
compensation, as the applicant has also failed to establish
that her condition was medically caused by her employment.
To establish medical causation, an employee must prove
that her disability "is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related activity." 729 P.2d
at 27. The key question is "whether, given this body and this
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to the injury." Id.
at 24.

This requirement serves two important purposes:

it

helps prevent an employer from becoming a general insurer, and
it aids in discouraging fraudulent claims. Id. at 27. Medical
causation is a question of fact for the Commission, reviewed
under the highly deferential "substantial evidence" standard.
Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The Commission found that the applicant failed to estab-
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lish any medical causal connection between her employment and
her subsequent back condition.

In making this finding, the

Commission relied on the medical evidence, including a report
provided

by

Dr. Gerald

Moress

and

Dr. Wallace

Hess,

who

examined the applicant and reviewed her medical records at the
request of Merit Medical.

A medical panel appointed by the

administrative law judge suggested that there was a "limited"
connection between the applicant's employment and her back
problems, but the Commission concluded, after careful analysis,
that this report was ambiguous, equivocal, and unpersuasive.
Under the Act, the Commission has the right to decide whether
to adopt findings made in a medical panel report, and the
Commission's ultimate finding that the applicant failed to
establish

medical

causation

was

supported

by

substantial

evidence in the record.

A.

The Commission is not bound to adopt findings made
in a medical panel report.

The Industrial Commission is not required to blindly adopt
findings presented by a medical panel.

Under former section

35-1-77

Act, the

of

the

Workers' Compensation

Commission

commission "may" refer the medical aspects of a disputed claim
to a medical panel.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1) (a) (1994)

(recodified

Code

at

Utah

Ann.

§

34A-2-601(1)(a)

(1997)).

However, the Commission must decide on its own whether to
follow the medical panel's report:
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The commission may base its finding and
decision on the report of the panel, medical
director, or medical consultants, but is not bound

by the report
if other substantial
evidence in the case supports a contrary
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

35-1-77(2)(d)

(1994)

conflicting
finding,

(emphasis

added)

(recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(e) (1997)).
Under the plain language of this statute, the Commission
was not bound by the medical panel's report in our case.
First, nowhere does the statute require the Commission to base
its findings on the panel report; it simply says that the
Commission "may" do so. Second, the report of Drs. Moress and
Hess

clearly

constitutes

evidence in the case":

"other

substantial

conflicting

the report is "other" evidence, it is

"substantial" evidence, and it is "conflicting" evidence.
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the Commission
was free to make its own factual findings.
Utah case law also unambiguously provides that the Commission is not required to follow a medical panel report. For
example, in Greyhound Lines v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah
1986), the supreme court upheld the Commission's finding as to
the date of stabilization, even though that finding conflicted
with the date given by the medical panel.

In that case, the

medical panel had concluded that the applicant had reached
stabilization three months after his industrial accident, but
the Commission rejected this finding, instead relying on the
fact that the applicant's treating physician did not issue an
impairment
accident.

rating until almost two full years after the
Id. at 1022.
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The supreme court affirmed, finding that the Commission
was not bound to follow the medical panel report:

"Plaintiff

suggests that stabilization is a medical question and that, in
the absence of any objection, the report of the medical panel

must be accepted.
panel."

This misconstrues

Id. (emphasis added).

the role

of the

medical

Relying on the plain language

of section 35-1-77, the court explained that "the Commission
has the discretion to accept or reject a panel's report even in
the absence of objections."

Id. at 1023.

The supreme court again upheld the Commission's departure
from a medical panel report in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v.
Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983).

In that case, a medical

panel had concluded that there was no connection between the
employee's work and his subsequent heart attack, but another
doctor testified to the contrary.

The Commission disregarded

the medical panel report and found that medical causation was
established, and the supreme court once again affirmed.

The

court concluded that the Commission's finding was supported by
the evidence, "despite the contrary findings of the medical
panel."

Id^ at 1371-72.

There is no support in the statute, in the case law, or in
logic, for the applicant's argument that, because the report of
Drs. Moress and Hess was included in the medical records submitted to the medical panel, it somehow ceased to be "other
substantial conflicting evidence" under the statute.

The fact

that the Moress/Hess report was submitted to the medical panel
does not mean that the report ceased to exist, or that it
-36-

mysteriously lost its status as "evidence."

The applicant's

argument thus flies in the face of the plain language of the
statute.7
The Commission has the ultimate responsibility for making
factual findings in workers' compensation cases, and it has not
only the right, but the duty,

to consider all

of the relevant

evidence in doing so.

Cf. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d

828, 830 (Utah 1978).

In accordance with this principle, the

Act clearly provides that the Commission is not required to
blindly follow a report issued by a medical panel, and Utah
case law confirms this.

Therefore, the court should hold that

the Commission did not err by considering evidence in addition
to the medical panel report.

B*

The Commission's factual finding that the applicant
failed to establish medical causation should be
affirmed.
1.

The finding should be taken as conclusive
because the applicant has failed to marshal the
evidence supporting it.

As noted above, medical causation is a question of fact.
Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When a petitioner challenges an agency's findings of fact, the
appellate court must uphold the findings unless the petitioner

7

In addition, it appears that in Greyhound Lines, discussed
above, all of the relevant records had been submitted to the
medical panel, and the supreme court still held that the Commission
acted within its authority in rejecting the panel's report.
Wallace, 728 P.2d at 1021.
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establishes

that

they

are

not

supported

by

"substantial

evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997): VanLeeuwen v.
Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

The

party challenging findings of fact must " 'marshal all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.'"
in original).

VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 284 (brackets

If the applicant fails to marshal the evidence

supporting factual findings, the findings will be accepted as
conclusive.

Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450

(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In

our

case, the

applicant

appears

to challenge

the

Commission's factual finding that she failed to prove medical
causation, but she has not marshaled the evidence supporting
that

determination.

To

properly

marshal

the

evidence, a

petitioner must first set forth the evidence that supports

the

finding, and then carefully explain why that evidence is, in
fact, insufficient.

Then, only after

the supporting evidence

has been separately marshalled, can the petitioner address the
evidence he or she claims contradicts the finding.

See, e.g.,

Intermountain Health Care v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844
n.3

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (evidence contrary to the findings

should be referred to in briefing only after the supporting
evidence has been separately marshalled); Heinecke v. Dep't of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same).

-38-

However, the applicant begins by presenting the evidence
that supports her own position, instead of the Commission's
findings.
Moress

Moreover, her discussion of the report of Drs.

and

Hess

focuses

only

shortcomings of that report.

on what

she

feels

are

the

And, she does not even address

any of the nonmedical evidence that supports the Commission's
findings.

The law imposes a "heavy burden" on a party seeking

to overturn an agency's factual findings, Heinecke, 810 P.2d at
464, and the applicant has failed to carry this burden.

The

Commission's finding that there was no medical causation should
therefore be taken as conclusive.

2.

The Commission's finding
substantial evidence.

is

supported

by

Even if this court were to address this issue on the
merits, it would conclude that the Commission's finding of no
medical causation is supported by substantial evidence.

Most

importantly, the report from Drs. Moress and Hess unequivocally
states that there is no causal connection between the applic a n t s employment and her back problems.

R. 406-08.

Doctors

Moress and Hess examined the applicant and carefully reviewed
her medical records.

R. 400-06.

They performed the standard

credibility tests and found that the applicant's responses were
"inappropriate" in several categories.

R. 405. They reviewed

the CT scan and noted that it showed a small disc bulge on only
one angle, and that there was no other clear evidence of a disc
herniation.

R. 405.

They also explained that the CT scan
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revealed a "fracture of the apophyseal ring which had nothing
to do with the industrial accident and is developmental in
origin,"

R. 406. Finally, they pointed out that the applicant

did not feel any onset of pain while at work, and that it was
possible that she had simply been suffering from an acute low
back strain. R. 407. Drs. Moress and Hess therefore unequivocally

concluded

that

none

of

the

applicant's

impairment,

disability, or need for medical expenses was attributable to
her industrial exposure.

Id.

In addition, there are numerous "historical" facts supporting

the

Commission's

applicant never felt any

finding.

Most

importantly,

the

back pain, soreness, or stiffness

during the entire time she worked for Merit Medical.

Tran-

script, R. 113:17-21, 116:12-14. Also, the applicant's job did
not

require

any

heavy

lifting

or

excessive

bending:

as

discussed previously, the applicant simply lifted plastic bins
containing small plastic parts.

Cf. Allen, 729 P.2d at 27 n.9

(evidence of ordinariness of the exertion is relevant to the
issue of medical causation).

And, if the applicant's back

problems were really caused by her work, it is doubtful that
her pain would have first appeared when it did, while at home
on the day after an especially short and easy shift.
The applicant does not really argue that this evidence is
insufficient

to

support

the

Commission's

determination.

Instead, she presents various reasons why she feels that the
report of Drs. Moress and Hess is less persuasive than the
medical panel report.

But these arguments are not properly
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made on appeal.

The Commission has already determined which

report is more persuasive, and this court's role under UAPA is
not to review that determination; rather, this court's role is
simply to determine whether the Commission's findings are
supported by substantial evidence. As this court has pointed
out, "It is the province of the Board, not the appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence."

Grace Drilling Co.

v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Therefore, the court of appeals "will not substitute its
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even
though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case
come before us for de novo review."

Id.

At any rate, the Commission acted properly in choosing not
to be persuaded by the medical penal report, for the panel
report does not provide much support for the applicant's case.
For example, the panel stated that her work caused only a
"temporary aggravation," R. 418, and it could find only a
"limited" causal connection between the applicant's job and her
condition.

R. 417.

And the panel attributed merely one

percent of the applicant's impairment to her alleged industrial
exposure.

R. 418.

It is the applicant
workers' compensation

who bears the burden of proof in a
proceeding, and

she must

establish

medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Zupon, 860 P.2d at 963.

See

The Commission was certainly within

its discretion in deciding that the uncertain medical panel
report was not sufficient to meet that burden, particularly
-41-

when faced with the more definite, better reasoned report of
Drs. Moress and Hess and the nonmedical facts set forth above.
As the applicant herself admits, this is a close case.

The

Commission has made its decision, the decision is supported by
substantial

evidence,

and

the

decision

is

entitled

to

deference.

CONCLUSION

Respondents Merit Medical Systems, Inc., and TIG Insurance
Co. hereby respectfully request that this court enter an order
affirming the Industrial Commission's ruling in this case.

DATED this 5th day of December, 1997.

HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

THEODORE E. KANELL
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
Attorneys for Respondents
Merit Medical Systems, Inc.
TIG Insurance Co.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 1997,
two true and correct copies of the foregoing were handdelivered to the following:
Phillip B. Shell
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUEST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT
84107
Attorney for Petitioner
Alan Hennebold
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Attorney for Respondent
Industrial Commission
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ADDENDUM
1.

Industrial Commission Order Granting Motion For Review

2.

Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order

3.

Industrial Commission Order Denying Request for Reconsideration

4.

Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981) § 5-116
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Tabl

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LORI WARNER,
*
*

Applicant,
v.

*

MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.
and TIG INSURANCE COMPANY,

*

*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case No.

95-0555

Defendants.

Merit Medical Systems, Inc. and its workers' compensation
insurance carrier, TIG Insurance Company (referred to jointly as
"Merit" hereafter), ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review
the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Lori Warner
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Was Ms. Warner's work at Merit both the legal cause and the
medical cause of the injury for which she now seeks workers'
compensation benefits?
FINDINGS OF FACT
Ms. Warner seeks temporary total disability compensation,
permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for
a back injury allegedly caused by her work at Merit. Specifically,
she contends that cumulative trauma from her work resulted in pain
beginning March 24, 1995, which necessitated surgery in June 1995
to remove the disc at the L5-S1 level of her spine.
Ms. Warner began employment at Merit during January 1995, as
a molding operator. She worked the swing shift five days a week,
8 hours a day, servicing machines that produced plastic parts for
medical devices. As the machines produced the parts, they fell
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into bins with dimensions of 35" x 18" x 18". Ms. Warner would
remove the bins from the machines and carry them several feet to a
table where she emptied the bins into larger containers.
On average, Ms. Warner emptied 9 bins an hour.
On some
machines the bins were at waist level, while on other machines the
bins were on the floor. The bins weighed between 5 and 26 pounds
depending on how much product they contained. The heavier hoppers
tended to be at floor level. Because she was afraid of receiving
electrical shocks from the machines, Ms. Warner stood as far as
possible from them, which required her to lean over to pull the
bins from the machines.
Also as part of her duties, Ms. Warner periodically carried a
bin across the manufacturing room to a set of scales that were at
the height of her head. Additionally, she periodically checked the
dimensions of various parts by placing them on a table and
measuring them with calibers and gauges. She also vacuumed and
cleaned around her machines.
Ms. Warner has not identified any unusual work activity or any
pain related to her work prior to March 24, 1995. On March 23,
1995, she left work early with a headache caused by dental
problems. The next morning, she awoke with back pain and found it
difficult: to walk. She sought medical attention at an Instacare
clinic and was given a prescription for a muscle relaxant. She did
not report to work as scheduled on March 25, 1995 due to her back
pain. Then, on March 28, 19 95, she underwent a CT scan and was
diagnosed with 1) degenerative disc changes at the L5-S1 level of
her spine; 2) a bulging disc with possible herniated fragments at
the L4-5 level; and 3) evidence of old trauma at both sites.
On April 7, 1995, Ms. Warner was examined by Dr. Smith and
again diagnosed with degeneration at the L5-S1 and L4-5 levels,
with possible extruded fragments.
Dr.
Smith prescribed
conservative treatment, but after such conservative therapy failed
to alleviate Ms. Warner's pain, he performed a discectomy at the
L5-S1 level.
After surgery, Ms. Warner experienced some relief from her
back pain.
Her recovery was uneventful and she was placed on
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physical therapy for several months. She returned to work for a
time, but eventually stopped work due to continuing back pain.
Dr. Smith has expressed a very brief, conclusionary opinion
that Ms. Warner's work at Merit was a cause of her back pain and
ensuing surgery.
Merit then employed Dr. Moress, a neurologist,
and Dr. Hess, an orthopedist, to examine Ms. Warner and review her
medical records. Based on this evaluation, the doctors noted that
Ms. Warner's back pain did not occur at work and that she could not
recall any specific work event that might have triggered the pain.
They concluded that she suffered from ''fractured apophyseal rings"
at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels with associated bulging discs, but
that such conditions were developmental in nature and not related
to her work at Merit.
In light of the difference of opinion between Dr. Smith on one
hand and Dr. Hess and Dr. Moress on the other, the ALJ appointed a
medical panel consisting of Dr. Smoot, an orthopedist, and Dr.
Thomas, a neurologist, to evaluate the medical aspects of Ms.
Warner's claim. The panel examined Ms. Warner and reviewed her
medical records, then submitted a report finding
a "limited"
causal connection between her work and her back problems.
The
panel did not explain what it meant by a "limited" causal
connection, but did point out that Ms. Warner's x-rays showed
preexisting back problems resulting from "old changes".
The
medical panel concluded that Ms. Warner had a 5% whole person
impairment due to her low back problems, but that only 1% was
attributable to her work at Merit.
The panel attributed the
remaining 4% impairment to her pre-existing problems. Finally, the
panel concluded that Ms. Warner's medical care and surgery was
necessary to care for her work related injury "to a limited
extent." The medical panel commented:
It is quite possible that the surgery may not have been
needed at that time had there been more concern for the
functional aspect of her reaction to her total
circumstances.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers and
their workers' compensation insurance carriers to provide
disability compensation and medical care to employees injured by
accidents "arising out of and in the course of their employment."
In order to qualify for such benefits, an injured worker must
establish by a preponderance of evidence that 1) the employee's
work is the legal cause of the injury for which benefits are
sought; and 2) the employee's work is the medical cause of the
injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
Because Merit contends that Ms. Warner's work at Merit was
neither the legal cause nor the medical cause of her injuries, the
Industrial Commission will consider both issues.
I.

LEGAL CAUSATION:

In order to obtain benefits under Utah's Workers' Compensation
Act,
a worker with a preexisting medical condition must prove
that his or her work is the legal cause of the injury for which
benefits are claimed. This requirement of legal causation is met
when the worker shows an unusual or extraordinary exertion at work
that exceeds the exertions experienced by a typical individual in
everyday nonemployment life. Allen at 25.
The evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Warner suffers
from a preexisting low back condition related to the injury for
which she now seeks workers' compensation benefits.
She must,
therefore, show some unusual or extraordinary exertion arising from
her work at Merit.
In other words, she must prove that her
employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk
she already faced because of her preexisting condition.
The Industrial Commission has carefully considered the demands
of Ms. Warner's work at Merit, as well as the manner in which Ms.
Warner performed those duties, and concludes that her work
exertions were not unusual or extraordinary when compared to the
typical exertions of modern day life. The lifting, carrying and
standing that Ms. Warner did at Merit is not different from the
exertions
involved
in changing a flat tire, doing
laundry,
moving garbage cans and recycling bins, lawn care, or caring for
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young children, to mention just a few everyday activities. The
Industrial Commission recognizes that Ms. Warner's work required
her to carry as many as 9 bins an hour, but the bins were not heavy
and usually were not carried very far. When the full range of all
non-employment activities are considered, even the frequency of Ms.
Warner's lifting and carrying at work is not unusual or
extraordinary. The Industrial Commission therefore finds that Ms.
Warner's work at Merit is not the legal cause of her injury.
XL

MEDICAL CAUSATION:

In order to establish medical causation, an injured worker
must establish a medically demonstrable causal link between the
stress, strain or exertion of the worker's employment and the
worker's injuries. Allen at 27. In considering whether Ms. Warner
has established such a link between her work at Merit and her
injuries, the Industrial Commission looks primarily to the opinions
of the medical experts who are familiar with Ms. Warner's medical
history and her current complaints.
Dr. Smith, who performed surgery on Ms. Warner's back, has
reported that her back injury is work related.
In making this
assessment, Dr. Smith apparently
relies on Ms. Warner's
representation to him that her back pain was ''brought on" by her
work. This statement is contrary to the fact that Ms. Warner did
not experience back pain at work, but rather, began to suffer back
pain when she awoke in the morning, after she had been away from
work for most of a day.
Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess, the specialists who examined Ms.
Warner on behalf of Merit, have stated their unequivocal opinion
that Ms. Warner's current low back problems are not caused by her
work, but are entirely the result of preexisting conditions. This
opinion is persuasive because it is supported by a thorough review
of Ms. Warner's medical records, as well as physical examination of
Ms. Warner.
The doctors' opinion also appears consistent with
circumstances surrounding the onset of Ms. Warner's low back
problems during March 1995.
The final opinion regarding medical causation is that of the
medical panel appointed by the ALJ. As did Dr. Moress and Dr.
Hess, the medical panel thoroughly reviewed Ms. Warner's medical

-1157

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
LORI WARNER
PAGE 6
records and examined Ms. Warner. However, on the issue of medical
causation, the panel was unusually equivocal when it concluded
there was "a limited
medically demonstrable causal connection"
between Ms. Warner's work and her low back pain. The panel did not
explain what it meant by a "limited" causal connection, but the
panel specifically noted that Ms. Warner's x-rays showed preexisting injuries. On the question of whether Ms. Warner's surgery
had been necessary to treat a work related injury, the medical
panel was even more ambiguous.
In considering the probative value of the three medical
opinions cited above, the Industrial Commission gives least weight
to Dr. Smith's statements because they lack detail and foundation.
The Industrial Commission finds the medical panel's report somewhat
unpersuasive because of its ambiguous and equivocating answers. In
contrast, the report of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess is well reasoned
and consistent with the circumstances under which Ms. Warner began
to experience low back pain. The Industrial Commission therefore
accepts the opinion of Dr. Moress and Dr. Hess that there is no
medical causal connection between Ms. Warner's work at Merit and
her low back injury.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission concludes that Ms. Warner has failed
to establish that her work at Merit is the legal and medical cause
of the low back injury for which she seeks workers' compensation
benefits. The Industrial Commission therefore grants Merit's
motion for review, sets aside the ALJ's order, and dismisses Ms.
Warner's application for benefits. It is so ordered.
Dated th

March , 1997.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
LORI WARNER
PAGE 7
DISSENT:
The Commission, through its Administrative Law Judges,
utilizes medical panels on a continuing basis.
The Commission
routinely remands those cases decided by ALJ's without the use of
medical panels if the Commission finds that medical issues,
opinions, or expenses need to be resolved by a medical panel as
delineated in administrative rule R568-1-9.
This instant case
involves the use of a medical panel to assist the Commission in
resolving the differing medical opinions raised by the treating
physician and reviewing medical doctors paid by the insurance
company.
The majority doesn't accept the response from the medical
panel report wherein it states "There is a limited medically
demonstrable causal connection...." (page 6 ) . My colleagues have
decided that the medical panel's conclusion was "unusually
equivocal" through the panel's use of the word "limited".
The
majority also gives little weight to the treating physician's
opinion
that
there
is a
"medically demonstrative
causal
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems [he
has] been treating".
The majority apparently feels that the
treating physician merely automatically accepted what Ms. Warner
told him regarding the pain and its source and, therefore, his
response in "To Whom It May Concern" and in the Summary of Medical
Record (form 113) simply restates his lack of knowledge, even
though he surely had the most fundamental and
intimate
understanding of the claimant's problem as he was also the surgeon
as well as the treating physician.
This case epitomizes what is so difficult in these issues. It
is such a close call that even the medical panel obviously
struggled with the decision. And because it is so close, one must
recognize that even though the most conscientious in the medical
community who are being hired by an insurance company (as is the
case here) easily and almost automatically arrive at decisions that
do not favor the claimant. That is precisely why the medical panel
system is used.
It is my understanding that the medical panel
concept was created to avoid the possibility of representational
bias as the panel is paid by the Commission through a statutorily
described method.
Certainly, that is the logic behind its
continued useage today.
By rejecting the opinion of the
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Commission's own medical experts, I believe the majority stretches
beyond its capability and knowledge to adequately judge this case
and, in effect, ignores the fundamental purpose of the medical
panel in arriving at its conclusion.
Also, Section 35-1-77(2)(d) states rather clearly that "The
commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the
panel . . . but is not bound by the report if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding".
(underline added for emphasis) In this instant case, the medical
panel reviewed all the medical facts including the opinion of the
insurance company's paid reviewing medical doctors. The panel also
examined the claimant. There is no other substantial conflicting
evidence. (underline added for emphasis)
My reading of this
statutory language is that the legislature has allowed the
Commission to use medical panel reports as the foundation of its
findings regarding medical issues. By adding the other language of
"not bound by" and "if" regarding "other substantial conflicting
evidence", the legislature restricted the Commission's discretion
normally allowed by the use of the word "may".
Therefore,
following the premise of this reading, I would conclude that my
colleagues' decision may not be consistent with the requirements of
the statute.

[IS //S7 # *c day of March, 1997.
DATED THIS

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
NQTICS OF APPEAL RIgHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission. Any such request for reconsideration must be received
by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah
Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court
within 3 0 days of the date of this order.
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Case No. 95555

LORI WARNER,
Applicant,
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MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC./
TIG INSURANCE,
Defendants.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
February 6, 1996 at 10:00 o' clock a.m.
Said
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was represented by Phillip Shell,
Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Theodore Kanell,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation
(TTC), medical expenses and permanent impairment benefits related
to low back injury caused by cummulative trauma on the job. The
defendants deny all liabiity in this case, based primarily on the
lack of a medical causal connection between the applicant/s work
exposure and the back problems that she began having on March 24,
1995.
The defendants also assert that any back injury she
sustained is non-compensable, as she had a contributory preexisting condition and was not injured as a result of any unusual
exertion (as required for compensability, per the ruling in Allen
v. Industrial Commissionf 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). The applicant
relies on the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. J. L. Smith,
to support her contention that her back problems and need for
surgery are related to repetitive bending, twisting and lifting in
her job with Merit Medical Systems, Inc. She claims TTC from March
24, 1995 through September 21, 1995 (she returned to work on
September 22, 1995), medical expenses and permanent impairment
benefits (she has been rated by her own treating physician, Dr. J.
L! Smith at 5% whole person and by the defendants' chosen
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physician, Dr. G. Moress, at 10% whole person). The defendants
rely on the opinion of their chosen physician, Dr. G. Moress, to
support their contention that there is no medical causal connection
between the applicant's back problems and her work at Merit Medical
Systems, Inc.
Because of the divergent medical opinions regarding the
causal connection between the applicant's injury/condition and her
work at Merit Medical, the ALJ determined that the matter should be
referred to a medical panel for additional input on the causal
controversy. The matter was referred to the medical panel on May
14, 1996. The medical panel report was received at the Commission
on July 11, 1996, and was distributed to the parties on that same
date, with 15 days allowed for the filing of objections. On July
25, 1996, the ALJ received comments from the applicant. On August
16, 1996, the ALJ received comments/argument from the defendants.
The matter was considered ready for order as of July 26, 1996.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
The applicant is a female who was 35 years old on March 24,
1995, with no spouse nor minor children. She was employed with
Merit Medical Systems, Inc. at that time, as a molding operator,
working 40 hours per week, earning a wage of $7.30/hour.
The
applicant began performing this job in January of 1995 and she
worked swing shift, from 2:00 PM to 10:00 PM. The applicant's job
consisted of servicing a number of large machines that manufactured
plastic medical parts, such as syringe barrels, angioplasty barrels
and "cock manifolds." The machines were quite large, measuring
over 5 feet tall and over 10 feet long. A drawing of one of the
machines was submitted at hearing and was marked as Exhibit A-l.
A video was also shown at hearing in which several of the machines
are seen. The applicant has argued that the drawing and the video
do not show the full range of machines that she serviced and that
some of the machines were quite different than the ones seen on the
video. The defendants apparently feel that any difference in the
machines serviced by the applicant is irrelevant to the nature of
the applicant's work duties.
One of the applicant's main responsibilities was to empty
a plastic tote that was positioned on the machine4 to catch the
completed parts as the machine produced them. Apparently, the size
of the totes is not in dispute. The applicant described the totes
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as being 2% feet by 1% feet by 1% feet and she estimated that they
weighed 5 pounds when empty. The weight of the totes when they
were to be emptied and the number of totes that the applicant
handled in an average shift are very much in dispute.
The applicant estimated that the totes weighed anywhere from
5 pounds to 35 pounds when she emptied them, with the average tote
weighing around 25 pounds. Rex Teitgen, the molding manager at the
time that the applicant was working for Merit Medical, testified
that the heaviest tote, per a read-out of the scales where the
totes were weighed, was 26 pounds. Therefore, it is the defendants
position that the average tote weighed considerably less than 25
pounds.
There was quite a bit of confusion regarding in the
testimony regarding how many totes needed to be emptied per hour.
The number of totes to be handled was dependent upon a number of
variables. First, this depended on how many machines a worker was
handling at any given time. The machines were located in a very
large room and there were 5 to 8 workers working together in the
room at one time. Apparently, most workers were responsible for
just 3 machines at a time. However, when a worker needed to go on
break or lunch, the other workers filled in and took care of the
machines assigned to the absent worker.
The defendants
acknowledged that this occurred, but it is unclear if the defense
witnesses took this into consideration in estimating how often a
worker would be emptying a tote. The applicant estimated that she
emptied 3 totes per hour off each machine for which she was
responsible (at least 9 totes total per hour). However, she stated
that this was when the machines were set to produce at a maximum
rate, which was not all the time.
Rex Teitgen, the molding
manager, estimated that a worker would be emptying just 4 totes per
hour total.
Per the video, the totes were emptied by sliding the tote
out from the machine and walking several feet over to a table where
the contents of the tote were either poured into a plastic bag (if
the parts were quite small) or were lifted out by the handful and
placed into another larger tote (if the parts were somewhat
larger). Although Rex Teitgen testified that all the totes were
located in the same place on all the machines (waist height or just
below), the applicant testified that on some of the machines, the
tote was located on the floor, requiring the worker to bend over to
pick up the tote so it could be emptied. The applicant stated that
the machines that had the totes on the floor manufactured the
larger heavier parts. In addition, the applicant stated that she
wbuld get an electrical shock from some of the machines as she
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emptied the totes, if any part of her body touched the machine as
she did so. In order to avoid this shock, the applicant stated
that she would stand as far away from the machine as she could and
then would lean and reach over to pull the tote out. Rex Teitgen
testified that no one ever reported to him that they were shocked
by any of the machines.
In addition to emptying the totes on the machines, the
workers were required to periodically take a tote or bag of
completed parts over to a table where the parts were weighed by the
worker and measured. Once again, there was considerable disparity
between the testimony of the applicant and the defense witnesses on
what was required for this task.
The applicant referred to
carrying the totes across the large room to a weighing table. Then
she stated she needed to lift the tote full of parts to head height
in order to get it on the scale. She stated that she then lifted
the tote off the scale and carried it over to the quality assurance
(QA) inspectors. About once per hour, the applicant stated she
also had to spend some time standing at a table checking dimensions
on the manunfactured parts. She used calipers and pin gauges to do
this. She stated that she was allowed to sit or stand, but felt
that the supervisors preferred the workers to stand so they could
quickly get back to service a machine, if necessary. The applicant
estimated that the measuring took about 20 minutes, during which
the machines would continue to produce parts. The applicant stated
tha the machine totes could get quite full while she was away doing
the measuring and this resulted in heavier totes. Rex Teitgen, the
molding manager, stated that he felt the measuring would take only
10-12 minutes, but admitted that this was based on all workers
being present without consideration of need to fill in for a worker
on lunch or breaks.
The video shows that the large totes into which the parts
were dumped were located on wheeled carts. Rex Teitgen stated that
there was no need to carry these totes over to the scale. He
indicated that they could be wheeled over to the scale on the cart.
However, the applicant stated that the video shows the current setup at Merit Medical and that this set-up is not the same as it was
when she worked there. She stated that initially there were no
wheeled carts on which to move the totes and they had to be carried
over to the scale. In addition, she stated that when the carts
were obtained, there was not a cart assigned to each machine and
therefore a cart was not always available for transporting the
larger totes to the scale. Teitgen testified that he felt that
e\ren though there was only 3 wheeled carts during early 1995, that
O«J4B28
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a cart would always be available for the workers to transport the
totes. He stated that he never personally saw a worker carrying a
tote over to the scale, but he could not say that it never
happened.

The applicant testified that she needed to move quickly and
continually in order to service 3 machines and that there was no
time when she was just standing or sitting.
In addition to
servicing the machines, the applicant stated that she periodically
needed to vacumn the floors at the end of the shift to pick up"any
fallen parts. The applicant also testified that she felt the video
was not necessarily representative of her work duties, for the
reasons already noted, and because she stated that the video showed
the day shift, whereas she worked swing shift. Unfortunately, it
was not clear to the ALJ what specifically was different about the
two shifts.
On March 23, 1995, the applicant was working her normal
shift, but went home early that day.
She left early due to a
headache that was related to a dental problem.
The applicant
testified that the next morning, on March 24, 1995, she awoke with
low back pain radiating to her right buttocks and down past her
knee. The applicant stated that she had difficulty walking at that
time, as well.
She stated that she could not recall anything
unusual about her work duties in the weeks just preceding March 24,
1995. The applicant went to the Holladay Instacare on March 24,
1995 with complaints of back pain and pain walking noted at the
clinic.
The record for that visit is handwritten and very
illegible.
The applicant testified that she was given a
prescription for muscle relaxants. She rested the rest of that day
and the next and was scheduled to work March 26, 1995. She stated
she called in to work on that day and indicated that she would not
be there due to problems she was having walking.
The follow-up she got after going to Instacare is somewhat
unclear. The medical record exhibit, Exhibit D-l, does not show
any follow-up at Instacare. There is a March 28, 1995 report of a
CT scan of the lumbar spine, with the referring physician being Dr.
Clark Newhall. It is unclear how the applicant got referred for
this scan and what involvement Dr. Newhall had in the applicant's
care. The CT scan was read as follows:
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1.

Degenerative disc changes L5-S1 with Grade
I-II central disc bulge and associated
irregular
calcification
possibly
representing old ring apophyseal avulsion.
No significant neural element compromise.

2.

Grade I diffuse bulge L4-5 with associated
suspected small Grade I-II superiorly
extruded herniated fragment. There is also
irregularity of the posterior ring apophysis
suggesting old trauma to this apophysis as
well.

3.

Otherwise unremarkable CT of the lumbar
spine.

The applicant testified that Cottonwood Hospital referred
her to Dr. J. L. Smith. Dr. Smith saw the applicant for the first
time on April 7, 1995 and he noted that she had injured her back on
March 24, 1995 and had pain and difficulty in the buttocks since
that time. He read X-rays to show degeneration at L5-S1 (grade III) and some at L4-5 with a possible extruded fragment.
He
prescribed anti-inflammatories and exercise and noted that if the
applicant did not improve he "might have to go after the extruded
fragment." When Dr. Smith saw the applicant again on April 13,
1995, he noted that the applicant was worse and that an attempt to
return to work was unsuccessful. He took the applicant off work,
referred her for physical therapy and noted that he planned to
schedule surgery, if she was still symptomatic by May 2, 1995.
The applicant was seen at Southwest Emergency on April 14,
1995 with complaints of back pain that had begun on March 24, 1995.
It was noted that the pain was in the low back and hips, with the
right buttocks pain resolved.
No numbness or tingling was
reported.
The report notes that the applicant originally had
thought that her symptoms were flu related. Also noted was the
fact that her job involved alot of bending, but not lifting of more
than 20 pounds. An acute lumbar strain was diagnosed and the
applicant was referred back to Dr. Smith for follow-up.
The
attending physician noted that he was not sure if her problem was
work related. When Dr. Smith saw her again on May 2, 1995, he
noted that the applicant was no better and that physical therapy
had not helped. He noted that the applicant had low back pain
radiating down her leg that she was unable stand anymore. He noted
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that he informed the applicant that surgery offered a 50-70% chance
of helping her. It was decided that he would go forward with a
discectomy.
The applicant was at Cottonwood Hospital from June 5, 1995
through June 7, 1995 for the surgery. The records for the visit
and surgery are somewhat confusing.
The history and physical
examination report notes that the applicant had a history of right
leg pain only for 3 months. The diagnosis is listed as herniated
disc at L4-5 and encroachment on L5-S1. Although the procedure on
the operative report is listed as: discectomy L4-5 and right
exploration L5-S1, the actual report suggests that an L5-S1
discectomy was the only procedure performed. After the surgery,
the applicant followed-up with Dr. Smith. The applicant stated
that the surgery did help in that she was able to walk afterwards
and could not prior to the surgery. However, she stated that she
still had low back pain and buttocks pain, as of the date of the
hearing, and she stated she was still taking medication and seeing
Dr. Smith, as of that time.
Dr. Smith completed a Summary of Medical Record form dated
June 22, 1995. On that form he notes an affirmative answer to the
question regarding a causal connection between the work injury and
the treatment offered (the reference to a March 24, 1992 is
apparently a mistake).
He notes future treatment as physical
therapy and the permanent impairment rating as unknown. Dr. Smith
also wrote a letter to-whom-it-may-concern dated August 10, 1995.
In that letter, Dr. Smith notes an August 1986 slip in the shower,
but notes that the applicant had no back pain after that until
March 24, 1995. The one record with respect to the 1986 shower
incident is an FHP urgent care visit note. It indicates that the
applicant slipped in the shower and tried to catch herself, but did
not fall. It notes extreme low back pain, with an injection and
prescription medication offered as treatment. The applicant stated
that this resolved in one or two days. Dr. Smith's August 10, 1995
letter goes on to note that the applicant told him that her pain
was brought on by her work, where she did repetitive lifting and
bending type motions. In this letter, Dr. Smith notes that the
applicant had an extruded fragment at L4-5, for which he did a
discectomy and exploration of L5-S1. In a letter dated January 4,
1996, Dr. Smith notes that the applicant had reached maximum
medical improvement and had a 5% whole person rating.
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The applicant was seen by Dr. G. Moress and Dr. W. Hess on
January 22, 1996 at the request of the defendants. The report for
that examination notes that the applicant complained of pain of
6/10 at the time of the visit, the same level as pre-surgery.
Buttocks aching and leg tingling were also noted as complaints.
The report states that the doctors read the CT scan to show a small
disc bulge at L4-5 and possibly one at L5-S1, without any
compromise of the neural structures.
The fracture of the
apophyseal ring seen on the CT was developmental in origin per Dr.
Moress and Dr. Hess. Dr. Moress and Hess note that it was unclear
to them which level of the applicant's spine Dr. Smith operated on
and what exactly he did in the operation. Dr. Moress and Hess
include in their diagnostic impression a diagnosis of pain disorder
characterized by psychological factors. The doctors note that the
applicant's examination was replete with inappropriate credibility
tests.
Because the applicant's pain began away from the work
place, the doctors conclude that it was difficult to assign the
applicant's work as the cause of her back injury/condition. The
doctors rated the applicant at 10% whole person, all of which they
found to be unrelated to the applicant's work.
PRELIMINARY FACT CONCLUSIONS:
With respect to factual conclusions regarding the specifics
of the applicant's work duties, the ALJ will need to simply offer
ranges in the weights and number of repetitions involved.
The
testimony was rather divergent and there were no obvious
credibility problems, so that the ALJ must conclude that the two
witnesses (the applicant and Teitgen) just honestly estimate
differently. With respect to the average weight of the totes, the
ALJ finds that they weighed anywhere from 5-20 pounds generally,
with some occasionally weighing up to 26 pounds. The applicant
herself apparently told the Southwest Emergency personnel that she
did not lift in excess of 20 pounds and thus the ALJ finds the
applicant's hearing testimony of an average of 25 pounds to be
somewhat of a high estimate. With respect to the number of times
the applicant had to empty a machine tote, the ALJ accepts the
applicant's testimony of at least 9 times per hour, as the ALJ
believes that Teitgen's testimony did not account for times when
the applicant may have been operating more than just her 3 assigned
machines. The ALJ also accepts the applicant's testimony that she
did carry totes to the scale, rather than pushing them on a cart,
as the carts were either totally unavailable or only occasionally
available for her use. The ALJ finds that the video gives only a
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very general idea of the applicant's work site and work duties, and
should not be accepted as an exact representation of the work the
applicant performed.
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT:
In addition to her back symptoms, the panel report notes
that the applicant currently has irritable bowel syndrome and
currently takes medication (doxepin) for stress management. The
panel notes that the applicant feels that she has emotional
problems. The panel notes that the applicant's pain diagram shows
symptoms in all 4 limbs and over most of the spine/back. The panel
also notes that the applicant acknowledged a long history of
depression (with past treatment) . With respect to the back, the
panel noted that the applicant did have prior X-ray evidence of
"changes." Even so, the panel concluded that there was a "limited"
medical causal connection between the applicant's low back problems
and her work exposure from January 1995 through March 1995. The
panel specified this limited connection to be a work aggravation of
her prior impaired condition, occurring in a "setting of
psychologic overlay."
However, the panel found that the
applicant's gastro-intestinal problems and her depressive symptoms
were long-standing and were not caused by her work exposure. Low
back treatment after March 24, 1995 was found to be necessitated by
the work exposure, including the June 5, 1995 surgery.
With
respect to the surgery, the panel did comment as follows:
It is quite possible that the surgery may not have
been needed at that time had there been more
concern for the functional aspect of her reaction
to her total circumstances.
The panel rated the applicant's low back condition at 5% whole
person, attributing 1% whole person to the applicant's early 1995
work exposure and 4% whole person to pre-existing conditions. The
panel also found that the applicant medically stabilized about 3
months after the June 5, 1995 surgery.
OBJECTIONS/COMMENTS FROM THE PARTIES:
The comments filed by the applicant include a hand-written
letter noting a list of additional facts, and some correction of
panel facts, mostly in reference to symptoms, activity and work
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dating after the applicant's work exposure at Merit Medical. The
list also includes some refinements on the testing and symptoms
that occurred at the time that the applicant was seen at Southwest
Emergency. There is no argument submitted with this listing, and
in fact, the applicant's attorney included a cover letter with the
listing, noting that the applicant understood that her comments did
not necessarily raise any medical or legal issue sufficient to
controvert the panel's report.
The comments filed by the defendants note that the
defendants did not file objections to the medical panel report,
because the report seemed to indicate that Merit Medical should not
be responsible for payment of the surgery. The comments also note
that the defendants object to any claim for bladder problems. With
respect to the overall panel report, the defendants make an unclear
argument that there "may be a serious question as to the viability
of the medical panel report" and an insufficient "level of degree
of medical certainty" on the medical causal conclusion, due to the
applicant's "attacks upon the medical panel report." In closing,
the defendants note that they were reasserting the legal causation
argument (i.e. no unusual exertion) earilier made.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Medical Cause:
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the
medical causal issues in this case. The ALJ does so because the
panel report is the most soundly based medical opinion that clearly
addresses all the medical questions relevant to the applicant's
entitlement to benefits. In addition, the ALJ finds that there
have been no real objections to the panel findings and conclusions.
The defendants make an effort at stating some objection to the
panel findings on causation, but their argument in this regard is
difficult for the ALJ to understand and appears to relate back to
the applicant's comments, which are not really objections either.
As the ALJ can find no clearly explained objections to the panel's
conclusions, the ALJ finds that there are no real objections to the
report. As such, the ALJ adopts the panel findings.
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Although the panel commented on the interplay between the
applicant's "functional" or psychological concerns and her back
injury, the panel did not go so far as to make any conclusions that
the applicant's back problems were solely functional. Instead, the
panel clearly states that it found the back treatment necessitated
by the applicant's work exposure at Merit Medical in early 1995.
In conjunction with this, and consistent with this, the panel
specifically found that the back surgery was necessitated by the
work exposure. The panel stated this in very clear terms on page
seven of the report, under item number eight. Therefore, the ALJ
does not understand how the defendants read the report to indicate
otherwise. The panel did merely comment that, had the fucntional
concerns been investigated more closely, it may have been
determined that the surgery was unnecessary. However, the panel is
clear in their conclusion regarding the medical causal connection
between the work exposure and the surgery and makes the above-noted
comment only as a suggestion as to a different result that could
have happened, but did not.
Based on the above-explained interpretation of the medical
panel report and the above-explained reasons for adopting that
report, the ALJ adopts the panel conclusion that the applicant's
work exposure at Merit Medical medically caused her subsequent back
treatment and surgery. Consistently, the ALJ also adopts the panel
finding that the applicant has a 1% whole person permanent
impairment to her low back as a result of the work exposure.
Legal Cause:
In adopting the medical panel conclusions, the ALJ also
adopts the panel conclusion that the applicant had a contributory
pre-existing low back impairment (rated at 4% whole person). As a
result, per the Allen case cited at that beginning of this order,
in order for the applicant's back injury to be compensable, the
injury must have occurred as a result of exertion greater than what
is experienced away from work by the average late-20th century
individual.
Although the ALJ finds the ruling in Allen quite
logical and certainly preferable to the jumble of conflicting
opinions that existed prior to its issuance, the ALJ still has
considerable difficulty in applying the "unusual exertion" standard
to certain facts, especially in cases such as this, where there is
no obvious unusual strain (like lifting 100 pounds or doing
something rapidly over and over many times) . Depending on who you
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pick to be the "average" person, the applicant's lifting/carrying
of 5 to 20 pounds, 9 times per hour, may be more exertive or less
exertive than the average person's non-employment activities.
However, the ALJ finds that some consideration must be given to how
the lifting/carrying occurred.
In this case, the ALJ found that the applicant stood far
away from the machines, and reached over with her arms
outstretched, to remove the totes from the machines. The ALJ found
that she did this in order to avoid a potential electrical shock
that she felt might occur if she stood too closely to the machine.
Regardless of whether or not these electrical shocks were reality,
the applicant testified, and the ALJ accepted, that she had great
concern regarding this potential shocking. The exaggerated posture
would seem to the ALJ to cause her activity to be more strenuous
then had she stood close to the machine, and lifted the totes or
bins keeping them close to her body, as she did so. Taking this
into consideration, and without any real guidelines to use in
determining what "average" people do in their non-employment lives,
the ALJ concludes that the lifting of the 5-20 pound totes in this
exaggerated manner, nine times per hour, is slightly more exertive
than what the average person does in their everyday non-employment
lives.
As such, the ALJ concludes that legal causation is
established.
BENEFITS DUE:
Medical and legal causation established, the ALJ finds that
the applicant sustained a compensable industrial injury as a result
of her work activities at Merit Medical in early 1995.
The
applicant's compensation rate is figured as follows: $7.3 0/hour x
40 hours/week = $292.00/week x .667 = $194.76 or $195.00/week, when
rounded off as required by U.C.A. 35-1-75.
Based on the
conclusions of the medical panel, the applicant is due temporary
total compensation (TTC) for the period of medical instability,
apparently from March 24, 1995 through September 5, 1995 (3 months
after the June 5, 1995 surgery) . That period is 23 weeks and 5
days, or 23.714 weeks. The TTC award is thus $195.00/week x 23.714
weeks, or a total of $4,624.23. Permanent impairment benefits are
based on the 1% whole person rating offered by the panel. This
would entitle the applicant to an additional 3.12 weeks (312 weeks
for the whole person x .01) of benefits or $608.40 ($195.00/week x
3.12 weeks).
The applicant's total award is thus $5,232.63
($4,624.23 TTC + $608.40 PPI). Attorney fees, per R568-1-7, are
$1,046.53 ($5,232.63 X .20).
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay the applicant, Lori Warner,
temporary total compensation, at the rate of $195.00 per week, for
23.714 weeks, or a total of $4,624.23, for the period of medical
instability related to the early 1995 back injury, from March 24,
1995 to September 5, 1995. That amount is accrued and due and
payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A.
35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as
the result of the early 1995 back injury, as outlined in the order
above; said expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and
surgical fee schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay the applicant, Lori Warner,
permanent impairment benefits, at the rate of $195.00 per week, for
3.12 weeks, or a total of $608.40, for the 1% whole person
permanent impairment resulting from the early 1995 back injury.
That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Merit Medical
Systems, Inc./TIG Insurance, pay Phillip Shell, attorney for the
applicant, the sum of $1,046.53, plus 20.% of the interest on the
award, per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter, the same
to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be
remitted directly to the office of Phillip Shell.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 6346b-12.

DATED this 13th day of September, 1996.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ] 3 day of ~ ^ p T
1996,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, in the
case of Lori Warner, to the following parties:
POSTAGE PREPAID:
Lori Warner
7655 South 10th East
Midvale UT 84047
Theodore Kanell, Atty
4 Triad Center #500
PO Box 2970
Salt Lake City UT 84180
Phillip Shell, Atty
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT 84107
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LORI WARNER,

*
*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*

MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.
and TIG INSURANCE CO.,

*
*

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Case No. 95-0555

*

Lori Warner asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to reconsider its prior decision denying
Ms. Warner's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over Ms. Warner's request for
reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 and Rule R568-1-4.0, Utah Administrative
Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the Industrial Commission err in concluding that Ms. Warner had failed to establish that
her work at Merit Medical Systems, Inc. was the legal and medical cause of the injuries for which
she now seeks workers' compensation benefits.
DISCUSSION
In her request for reconsideration, Ms. Warner raises the same issues that the Industrial
Commission considered in reaching its prior decision in this matter. Having once more reviewed
the facts of Ms. Warner's claim, the Industrial Commission again concludes that Ms. Warner has
failed to establish either legal causation or medical causation in her claim for workers' compensation
benefits. The Industrial Commission therefore reaffirms its prior decision denying Ms. Warner's
application.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
LORI WARNER
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ORDER
The Industrial Commission reaffirms its prior decision in this matter and denies Ms.
Warner's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered.
DATED thii&yu& day of May, 1997.

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner

DISSENT
I dissent from the majority's conclusion that Ms. Warner has not established medical
causation, for the reasons expressed in my dissent from the Indi^tl^al Commission's previous
decision in this matter.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review
with that court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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LORI WARNER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request For Reconsideration in the
matter of Lori Warner, Case No. 95-0555, was mailed first class postage prepaid this^rv$-day of
May, 1997, to the following:
LORI WARNER
7655 SOUTH 10TH EAST
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047
PHILLIP B. SHELL
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L. C.
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
THEODORE E. KANELL
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500
P O BOX 2970
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2970
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEM
1600 WEST MERIT PARK WAY
SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84095
TIG INSURANCE
6925 UNION PARK CENTER #420
MTTWAT.R UTAH 84047

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission
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[Scope of Review; Grounds for Invalidity].

(a) Except to the extent that this Act or another statute provides otherwise:
(1) The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the
party asserting invalidity; and
(2) The validity of agency action must be determined in accordance with
the standards of review provided in this section, as applied to the agency
action at the time it was taken.
(b) The court shall make a separate and distinct ruling on each material
issue on which the court's decision is based.
(c) The court shall grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking
judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced by any one or more of the
following:
(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied.
(2) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of law.
(3) The agency has not decided all issues requiring resolution.
(4) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
(5) The agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure.
(6) The persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as
a decision-making body, motivated by an improper purpose, or subject to
disqualification.
(7) The agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court, which includes
the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional
evidence received by the court under this Act.
(8) The agency action is:
(i) outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by any
provision of law;
(ii) agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with a rule of
the agency; [or]
(iii) agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with the
agency's prior practice unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by
stating facts and reasons to demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency. [; or] [.]
(iv) [otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.]
COMMENT
The 1961 Revised Model Act prescribed tested cases, Section 15(g), no standards
standards for the judicial review of con- for the judicial review of rules, Section 7,
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and no mention of judicial review of
agency action other than rules or orders.
This Act, having established a single from
of action for judicial review of all types of
agency action in Section 5-105, prescribes
a single set of standards for judicial review in Section 5-116. This section is
adapted, with considerable changes, from
Florida Act, Section 120.68 and Wisconsin
Act, Section 227.20, which are discussed
with approval in Brodie & Linde, State
Court Review of Administrative
Action:
Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977
Ariz.St.LJ. 537.

was taken, and not at the time of judicial
review.
Subsection (c) requires the person seeking judicial relief to demonstrate substantial prejudice in order to be entitled to
relief. This prejudice must, moreover,
arise from one or more of the grounds
listed in the paragraphs under this subsection.
Paragraph (c)(3), providing for judicial
relief if the agency has not decided all
issues requiring resolution, deals with the
possibility that the reviewing court may
dispose of the case on the basis of issues
The standards for judicial review in this that were not considered by the agency.
section reflect the well-accepted principle An example would arise if the court had
that the role of the reviewing court is, in to decide on the facial constitutionality of
general, a limited one. The limited scope the agency's enabling statute, in a state
of judicial review provided in this section where agencies are precluded from passmay be superseded by another statute, ing on such questions; see Section 5which could either preclude judicial re- 112(1). This provision is not intended to
view entirely (an approach that might authorize the reviewing court to initially
raise constitutional questions), or estab- decide issues that are within the agency's
lish review based on different standards primary jurisdiction; such issues should
than those of this Act. Further, in some first be decided by the agency, subject to
states, the courts have established a con- the limited judicial review provided by
stitutional right to de novo judicial review this Act.
of certain matters in certain types of cirParagraph (c)(4) includes two distinct
cumstances; see, e.g., Strumsky v. San matters—interpretation and application
Diego Employees Retirement Assn., 11 of the law. With regard to the agency's
Cal.3d 28, 520 P.2d 29 (1974), noted in 63 interpretation to the law, courts generally
Calif.L.Rev. 27 (1975), 26 Hastings L.J. give little deference to the agency, with
1465 (1975). This Act includes some spe- the result that a court may decide that the
cial provisions on the scope of judicial agency has erroneously interpreted the
review of agency action in specified cir- law if the court merely disagrees with the
cumstances—Section 3-109(b) (review of agency's interpretation. By contrast, with
interpretative rules); Section 3-204(d)(5) regard to the agency's application of the
(review of rule after the administrative law to specific situations, the enabling
rules committee has filed an objection); statute normally confers some discretion
and Section 5-111(d) (review of agency upon the agency. Accordingly, a court
action on an application for stay or other should find reversible error in the agentemporary remedies, unless the agency cy's application of the law only if the
has found its action necessary to protect agency has improperly exercised its disagainst a substantial threat to the public cretion, within the framework of parahealth, safety, or welfare.) In addition, graph (c)(8).
this Act includes special adaptations of
One example of an agency's failure to
the Section 5-116 standards of review in follow prescribed procedure, under paraSections 5-202(c) and 5-203 (civil en- graph (c)(5), is the agency's failure to act
forcement).
within the prescribed time upon a matter
Subsection (a) places the burden of submitted to the agency. Relief in such
demonstrating the invalidity of agency ac- cases is available under Section 5-117(b)
tion upon the party who asserts invalidi- and (c).
ty. This subsection also emphasizes that
Paragraph (c)(7) establishes the "subthe focus of the reviewing court's inquiry stantial evidence on the whole record"
must be the agency action at the time it test for judicial review of determinations
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of fact that are made or implied by the
agency. In applying this test, the pertinent record is the whole record that is
before the court, which includes not only
the agency record, but also any additional
evidence received by the court in accordance with Section 5-114. Thus, if the
agency action under review is an order
resulting from a formal or conference
adjudicative hearing, and if no circumstances exist to justify the receipt of any
additional evidence by the reviewing
court beyond that contained in the agency
record, the substantial evidence test will
be applied to the agency record since in
this situation the agency record is the
"whole record before the court." By contrast, if the agency action under review is
a rule, or an order issued pursuant to
emergency or summary adjudicative proceedings, and if a determination of the
validity of the agency action requires resolution of a factual dispute, the court may
take new evidence under Section 5114(a)(3), and the "whole record before
the court" will then consist of a combination of the agency record plus the new
evidence taken by the court. The 1961
Revised Model Act, Section 15(g)(5), dealt
with judicial review of factual questions
only with regard to the review of contested cases. For those purposes, the 1961
Revised Model Act used the "clearly erroneous" test. This Act opts for the "substantial evidence" test, which was used in
the 1946 Model Act, Section 12(7)(e), and
is used in the Federal Act, Section
706(2)(E), and an increasing number of
states, either by express statutory language or by judicial interpretation; see B.
Schwartz, Administrative Law Section 214
(1976). Professor Schwartz also observes: "Substantial evidence is such evidence as might lead a reasonable person
to make a finding. The evidence in support of a fact-finding is substantial when
from it an inference of existence of the
fact may be drawn reasonably. In such a
case, the reviewing court must uphold the
finding, even if it would have drawn a
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contrary inference from the evidence."
Id., Section 210, at p. 595.
Paragraph (c)(8) is related, to some extent, to the formula found in the 1961
Revised Model Act Section 15(g)(6)—"arbitrary or capricious or characterized by
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." This Act offers
two options, depending on whether or not
bracketed subparagraph (iv) is adopted as
part of paragraph (c)(8).
Without the bracketed language, this
paragraph provides a more limited judicial role than the 1961 Model Act. The
intent of this limitation is to discourage
reviewing courts from substituting their
judgment for that of the agency as to the
wisdom or desirability of the agency action under review.
With inclusion of the bracketed language, this paragraph authorizes judicial
relief if the agency action is "otherwise
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."
This language is approximately although
not precisely the same as that of the 1961
Model Act. Cases decided under the 1961
Model Act are likely to be utilized, at least
to some extent, as interpretations of this
bracketed language of the 1981 Act, although the introduction of the term "unreasonable" in the bracketed language of
the 1981 Act may provide judicial opportunities for interpretations that differ
from precedents decided under the 1961
Model Act.
Note that subparagraph (iii) of (c)(8),
providing for judicial relief if the challenged agency action is inconsistent with
the agency's prior practice, is related to
Section 2-102, requiring agencies to prepare an index of their written final orders
and to make this index and the orders
available for public inspection and copying. A party may invoke the indexing
and public access requirements of Section
2-102, for the purpose of ascertaining the
agency's prior practice, so as to reveal
any inconsistency between the challenged
agency action and prior agency practice.

Law Review Commentaries
Judicial review of rulemaking under Texas
Survey of Kansas law: Administrative law.
administrative procedure and Texas Register Steve L. Leben. 37 U.Kansas L.Rev. 679
Act. John J. Watkins and Debora S. Beck. 34 (1989).
Baylor L.Rev. 1 (1982).
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American Digest System
Scope of review, see Administrative Law and Procedure <s=»741 to 800.
Encyclopedias
Scope of review, see C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 213 to 248.
WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation.

Notes of Decisions
Generally 1
Deference to agency interpretation of rules
2
Substitution of court's judgment for that of
agency 3

1. Generally
Administrative Procedure Act establishes
scope of review of Utilities and Transportation
Commission actions upon applications for motor carrier permits. Inland Empire Distribution Systems, Inc. v. Utilities and Transp.
Com'n, 1989, 770 P.2d 624, 112 Wash.2d 278.
Even though superior court has broader authority to review administrative decisions in
special action than under ordinary certiorari,
its primary purpose is to determine whether
administrative decision was arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion. Blake v. City of
Phoenix, App.1988, 754 P.2d 1368, 157 Ariz. 93.
2. Deference to agency interpretation of
rules
In reviewing administrative decisions by
state agencies, deference is given to agency's
interpretation of its own regulations; however,
such deference is not total and agency's interpretation must be examined to determine if it
is consistent with language of regulation and
with purpose which the regulation is intended
to serve. In re David B., 1986, 508 A.2d 1045,
127 N.H. 772.
In reviewing administrative agency's decision in petition for certiorari, agency's interpretation of its regulations is to be accorded
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great deference. Petition of Pelletier, 1984,
484 A.2d 1119, 125 N.H. 565.
Administrative agency's construction of a
statute is question of law reviewed de novo
under error of law standard with heightened
degree of deference given to administrative
agency's interpretation when statute is within
agency's field of expertise. Inland Empire Distribution Systems, Inc. v. Utilities and Transp.
Com'n, 1989, 770 P.2d 624, 112 Wash.2d 278.
3. Substitution of court's judgment for that
of agency
Administrative rule may be declared invalid
only if it violates Constitution or statute or was
adopted without compliance with statutory
procedures; consequently, court will not substitute its judgment for that of an agency nor
will it examine record for substantial evidence
in reviewing declaratory judgment on validity
of rule. American Network, Inc. v. Washington Utilities and Transp. Com'n, 1989, 776 P.2d
950, 113 Wash.2d 59.
Reviewing court properly refused to substitute its judgment for that of fact-finding tribunal where accusations concerning employee's
misconduct were subject of hotly disputed evidence at administrative hearing, with substantial evidence supporting positions of both employee and employer. Zavala v. Arizona State
Personnel Bd., App.1987, 766 P.2d 608, 159
Ariz. 256.
Under "error of law" standard, Appellate
Court may substitute its determination for that
of agency although agency's determination is
entitled to substantial weight. Montell v. State,
Dept. of Social and Health Services, 1989, 775
P.2d 976, 54 Wash.App. 708.

[Type of Relief].

(a) The court may award damages or compensation only to the extent
expressly authorized by another provision of law.
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